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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I. DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEY'S REFUSAL TO PRESENT PERJURED
TESTIMONY OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
In In re Goodwin,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court es-
tablished procedures for lawyers to follow when a client intends
to present perjured testimony at trial. The court held that if de-
fense counsel in a criminal action knows a client intends to pre-
sent false testimony, counsel should allow the defendant to take
the stand and deliver the testimony in narrative form. Counsel
should not, however, examine the defendant or use the false tes-
timony in closing argument.2
Goodwin had moved to withdraw from the case in an in
camera hearing before the trial judge. She asserted that contin-
ued representation of the defendant would violate Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 2-110(B)(2),3 which requires withdrawal when repre-
sentation would violate a Disciplinary Rule, and DR 7-102(A),4
which prohibits an attorney from presenting perjured testimony.
The trial judge denied the motion and subsequently held Good-
win and co-counsel Fairey in contempt for disobeying his order
1. 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983).
2. Id. at 277, 305 S.E.2d at 580. The court adopted the procedures suggested by the
American Bar Association for handling such a conflict. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION § 1.7 (1971). The standards suggest that the lawyer first advise his client
against taking the witness stand to testify falsely. If the defendant insists on testifying,
the standards suggest the lawyer withdraw if feasible. If withdrawal is not feasible, the
standards suggest the attorney follow the procedure the court adopted in Goodwin.
3. (B) Mandatory withdrawal. A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal,
with its permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment,
and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from em-
ployment, if:
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-110(B)(2) (Supp. 1983).
4. (A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-102(A)(4) (Supp. 1983).
1
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to proceed.5
In upholding the contempt citation,6 the supreme court rea-
soned that although an attorney has an ethical duty not to pre-
sent perjured testimony, the defendant's constitutional right to
representation by counsel must be protected.7 If the trial judge
had allowed the withdrawal, new counsel would be confronted
with the same problem and a series of withdrawals could follow.
More significant, however, is the likelihood that new counsel
would unknowingly present the false testimony.8 Therefore, the
court held that since counsel cannot reveal the specific conflict
to the judge,9 a motion to withdraw is within the discretion of
the trial judge and the judge's ruling will not be disturbed ab-
sent clear abuse.10
This procedure, which attempts "to accommodate [the] con-
flicting ethical duties" '11 of defense counsel, has received some
criticism. The most significant is that the accused is denied ef-
fective assistance of counsel.12 In Johns v. Smyth,13 a federal
5. The trial judge also enjoined the Richland County Defendant Corporation from
paying salaries to any of its attorney employees. The court reversed this portion of the
order, holding that the trial judge lacked authority to interfere because the supreme
court has exclusive regulatory authority over the Corporation. 279 S.C. at 278, 305 S.E.2d
at 580.
6. The court, although sympathetic to the attornieys' position, stated that Goodwin
and Fairey's refusal to proceed violated Circuit Court Rule 7, which provides that an
attorney may not withdraw except by order of the circuit judge. Since this was a novel
issue, however, the court imposed no sanctions. Id. at 277, 305 S.E.2d at 580.
7. Id. at 276, 305 S.E.2d at 579.
8. Id.
9. The Disciplinary Rules prohibit a lawyer from revealing a confidence or secret of
his client. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 4-101(B)(1) (Supp. 1983). Therefore, without his cli-
ent's informed consent, Goodwin could not inform the court of the details of the conflict.
10. The court stated that the trial judge should consider several factors in determin-
ing whether the motion to withdraw should be granted. The judge should "consider the
timing of the motion, the inconvenience to the witnesses, the period of time elapsed
between the date of the alleged offense and the trial, and the possibility that any new
counsel will be confronted with the same conflict." 279 S.C. at 277, 305 S.E.2d at 579.
11. Conflict exists because the defense lawyer has dual obligations. He is both an
officer of the court and the legal advocate for his accused client. Erickson, The Perjuri-
ous Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obli-
gations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75, 82 (1982).
12. The Erickson article, supra note 11, lists several other criticisms of the ABA
standards. First, if the trial is about to commence or has already begun, the trial judge
will probably deny counsel's motion to withdraw. Second, since the attorney-client privi-
lege prohibits an attorney from disclosing the specific conflict, denial of the motion is
inevitable. Furthermore, the court will likely conclude that the defendant intends to
commit perjury, and an enhanced sentence may result. Third, the prosecutor may object
2
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district court criticized defense counsel's refusal to argue to the
jury statements made by his client which he believed were false.
The court stated that, "The failure to argue the case before the
jury... manifestly enters the field of incompetency when the
reason assigned is the attorney's conscience. ' 14 In Lowery v.
Cardwell, 5 defense counsel sought to withdraw for similar rea-
sons. Judge Hufstedler stated that, "When defense counsel
moved to withdraw, he ceased to be an active advocate of his
client's interests. Despite counsel's ethical concerns, his actions
were so adverse to [the defendant's] interests as to deprive her
-of effective assistance of counsel.
16
Although there have been no Supreme Court decisions on
this issue, Chief Justice Burger, as an appellate judge, wrote:
[When] the lawyer's immediate withdrawal from the case is ei-
ther not feasible, or if the judge refuses to permit withdrawal,
the lawyer's course is clear: He may not engage in direct exam-
ination of his client to facilitate known perjury. He should
confine himself to asking the witness to identify himself and to
make a statement but he cannot participate in the fraud by
direct examination.
17
The decision in In re Goodwin is consistent with Chief Jus-
tice Burger's words. The South Carolina Supreme Court has,
therefore, discarded the notion that the attorney's "obligation of
confidentiality"18 requires the attorney to aid in the presentation
to the narrative form of testimony. By emphasizing the defense lawyer's failure to de-
velop his client's testimony, the focus of the trial shifts from a determination of defen-
dant's guilt or innocence to an inquiry into the defendant's perjury. Finally, if the lawyer
is permitted to withdraw, the defendant may seek to obtain a series of such withdrawals
or may be able to persuade an unsuspecting new lawyer to aid him in presenting the
false testimony. Id. at 82, 83.
13. 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
14. Id. at 953. The court went on to conclude:
It is as improper as though the attorney had told the jury that his client
had uttered a falsehood in making the statement. The right to an attorney
embraces effective representation throughout all stages of the trial, and where
the representation is of such low caliber as to amount to no representation, the
guarantee of due process has been violated.
Id.
15. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
16. Id. at 732 (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring).
17. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. Cmm. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966-67) (emphasis in original).
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of perjured testimony. The procedure adopted offers criminal
defense attorneys a method by which the confidence need not be
disclosed, and at the same time prevents them from perpetrating
a fraud upon the court.
I. DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEY'S ATTEMPT TO LimuI
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in In re Clarke,19 ex-
pressed its disapproval of attorneys attempting to limit liability
to their clients. The court also reaffirmed its willingness to take
appropriate disciplinary action independent of the recommenda-
tions of the Hearing Panel and Executive Committee of the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 20
Clarke was charged with a violation of DR 6-102(A),21 which
prohibits an attorney's attempt to limit malpractice liability.
Clarke required his client to sign a release when she sought to
obtain her file after an unsuccessful trial of her claim.22 The cli-
ent sought the file so that another attorney might pursue her
appeal. She refused to sign the release, and Clarke never deliv-
ered the file to her.
The Hearing Panel Report, which was adopted by the Exec-
utive Committee, found that Clarke had simply made an effort
to obtain a receipt for the file.23 The Report recommended that
the complaint against Clarke be dismissed. The supreme court,
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. Ray. 1469, 1477 (1966). The attorney has an obli-
gation to preserve his client's confidences. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, Canon 4 (Supp. 1983). See
supra note 9.
19. 278 S.C. 627, 300 S.E.2d 595 (1983).
20. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline consists of members
of the South Carolina Bar from each judicial circuit, equal to the number of circuit
judges in each respective circuit. The board members are appointed by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 3A (Supp. 1983). The court appoints a
chairman and four members to comprise the Executive Committee. Id. at § 4(A). A com-
plaint is assigned to a hearing panel, which consists of three non-Executive Committee
members. Id. at §§ 12(A), 2(G).
21. (A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liabil-
ity to his client for personal malpractice.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 6-102(A) (Supp. 1983).
22. The document which Clarke had prepared stated in part- "I hereby state that I
have been completely satisfied with the said David Ross Clarke's representation of me in
said suit, and agree to hold him harmless, forever, in connection with any past, present
or future developments concerning this matter." 278 S.C. at 629, 300 S.E.2d at 597.
23. Id. at 632, 300 S.E.2d at 598.
234 [Vol. 36
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however, found Clarke guilty of misconduct and held that a pub-
lic reprimand was the appropriate sanction.24 The court con-
cluded that the document was not a receipt but was an exonera-
tion agreement in which Clarke sought to obtain a release from a
possible malpractice action. The court found that Clarke's ac-
tions were such as to bring the legal profession into disrepute
and that he should he publicly reprimanded.
25
The supreme court established in Clarke that any attempt
to limit liability to a client will be dealt with harshly. The sanc-
tion imposed has case law support. In Tallon v. Committee on
Professional Standards," the court temporarily suspended an
attorney who had directed his client to execute a general release
of all malpractice claims she had against him. Attorneys should,
therefore, be careful not to include in agreements signed by cli-
ents any language that appears to be exculpatory. Additionally,
an attorney considering an appeal in a disciplinary matter
should be aware of the supreme court's willingness to impose
sanctions unrestricted by recommendations of the Board of
Commissioners.27
HI. DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEY'S MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT
In two recent disciplinary hearings, In re Burgess2 and In
re Hodges,29 the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated its
position that although constitutionally protected,30 lawyer ad-
vertising may exceed protected limits. For violations of state
regulations, the court will impose disciplinary sanctions.
The charges against Burgess were that his advertisements
24. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 598.
25. The court concluded that the matter was aggravated because the release Clarke
was seeking might be prejudicial to a minor, the true litigant in the action, and that the
minor's guardian had no right to sign a release. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 598.
26. 86 A.D.2d 897, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1982).
27. As support for its independence in imposing sanctions, the court cited Burns v.
Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1967), which held that the Board's report is advi-
sory only, and that the duty of the supreme court is to adjudge whether professional
misconduct has been shown and what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken. Id. at
331, 117 S.E.2d at 307.
28. 279 S.C. 44, 302 S.E.2d 325 (1983).
29. 279 S.C. 128, 303 S.E.2d 89 (1983).
30. The landmark decision regarding advertising by lawyers is Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue again in
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violated Disciplinary Rules 2-101(A)(1)(b), (A)(2)(f), and (E).31
Burgess was also charged with repeatedly neglecting legal mat-
ters entrusted to him in violation of DR 6-101(A).32 The court
held that the advertisements violated the standards set forth in
the Disciplinary Rules. The court also found Burgess guilty of
misconduct for repeated negligent misrepresentation of his
clients.33
The court found that the advertisements did not further the
legitimate aim of attorney advertising, which is to educate the
public and facilitate intelligent selection of counsel.3' Further-
more, the advertisements failed to disclose the nature of the ser-
vices offered and were presented in a showy and undignified
manner.
Based on these findings and a previous public reprimand of
Burgess,3" the court concluded that the appropriate sanction was
31. DR 2-101 provides in relevant part:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself. . . use or participate in the use
of, any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, mislead-
ing, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(1) Without limitation a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory, or unfair statement or claim includes a statement which:
(b) Omits to state any material fact necessary to make the state-
ment. . . not misleading;
(2) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself... use or participate in the
use of any form of public communication which:
(f) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showman-
ship, puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use of
slogans, jingles, or garish or sensational language or format.
(E) Any person desiring to expand the information authorized for disclosure
... may apply to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The relief granted
*. . shall be... universally applicable to all lawyers.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-101 (Supp. 1983).
32. DR 6-101 provides in relevant part-
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 6-101 (Supp. 1983).
33. The court found that because of the rapid growth of his bankruptcy practice,
resulting from the advertising campaign, Burgess began to negligently handle the affairs
of his clients. 279 S.C. at 46, 302 S.E.2d at 326.
34. Id., 302 S.E.2d at 326.
35. 275 S.C. 315, 270 S.E.2d 436 (1980). In this earlier disciplinary action, the court
found that Burgess charged and collected an excessive fee.
6
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permanent disbarment.36 Although the Executive Committee
recommended indefinite suspension, the court reasoned that, in-
dependent of the advertising violations, Burgess' repeated negli-
gent conduct would preclude his reinstatement in the future.37
In In re Hodges, the Boards" initiated action against Hodges
for publication of a misleading advertisement in violation of DR
2-101.'s In a brief opinion, the court held that Hodges was guilty
of misconduct and that the appropriate sanction was a public
reprimand. The court stated that the advertisements were mis-
leading, and pointed out that they were remarkably similar to
those disapproved of in Burgess.40
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harwell asserted that the
advertisements were neither false nor misleading and did not vi-
olate the Disciplinary Rules. He further argued that Hodges'
first amendment right of free speech would be violated by the
sanction.41
Justice Harwell based his conclusion on two recent Supreme
Court decisions, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona42 and In re
R.M.J.43 In Bates, the Supreme Court recognized that attorney
advertising is a form of commercial speech44 entitled to the pro-
tection of the first amendment.45 In R.M.J., the Court expanded
36. The court relied on S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 8(C) (Supp. 1983) which provides
in part:
A person who, having been publicly reprimanded for misconduct, is there-
after found guilty of subsequent misconduct, shall be suspended for an indefi-
nite period from the office of attorney at law, or permanently disbarred, de-
pending upon the seriousness of such misconduct.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 8(C)(Supp. 1983).
37. 279 S.C. at 48, 302 S.E.2d at 327.
38. See supra note 20 (explanation of composition of the Board).
39. See supra note 31 (relevant text of DR 2-101).
40. 279 S.C. at 129, 303 S.E.2d at 89.
41. Id. at 130-31, 303 S.E.2d at 90.
42. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
44. The Court relied in part on its decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court held that com-
mercial speech is protected by the first amendment and that the states therefore are not
free to completely suppress the dissemination of truthful information about entirely law-
ful activities. Id. at 773.
45. The Court held that the state's attempt to prohibit newspaper publication of a
truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of the attorney's legal ser-
vices violated his first amendment rights. 433 U.S. at 384. The Court emphasized, how-
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the attorney's right to advertise by requiring a state to draw its
restrictions carefully and to regulate in a manner "no more ex-
tensive than necessary to further [its] substantial interests."46
For the practicing attorney, the Bates and R.M.J. decisions
provide general guidelines but do not explicitly state criteria by
which to draft advertisements. 47 A comparison of the advertise-
ments in the Burgess and Hodges cases, however, may provide
some assistance. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the
only common violation was that both advertisements were mis-
leading. The court found the advertisements in Burgess mislead-
ing because they promised relief from financial difficulty but
failed to disclose that the relief offered was bankruptcy.48 Simi-
larly, in Hodges, the advertisements stated that the law firm
could help those faced with financial problems, but failed to dis-
close that the service offered was also bankruptcy.4e Based on
this comparison, the format used by Hodges would probably
have been acceptable had the advertisement stated that bank-
ruptcy was the service offered. Although the result in Hodges
may seem harsh, the Court in Bates stated that, "[T]he bar re-
tains the power to correct omissions that have the effect of
presenting an inaccurate picture. . . .",0 Practitioners should
bear this in mind when drafting advertisements in the future.
IV. DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEY'S COMMUNICATION WITH JURORS
Attorneys who communicate with jurors or prospective ju-
rors of cases in which the attorneys are involved will be disci-
plined. In In re Two Anonymous Members of The South Caro-
46. 455 U.S. at 191. The Court stated that "regulation-and imposition of disci-
pline-are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or
where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact
been deceptive." Id. at 202. When the advertising is not false or misleading, the states
may still regulate it, but they "must assert a substantial interest and the interference
with speech must be in proportion to the interest served." Id. at 203.
47. Although expressing no opinion about the proposed ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the Court included in a footnote the entire text of Rule 7.1, which pro-
hibits misleading advertising. Id. at 201-02 n.14. This rule explains which communica-
tions are false or misleading, and may provide some guidance to attorneys contemplating
advertising.
48. 279 S.C. at 46, 302 S.E.2d at 326. In addition, one advertisement did not reveal
that Burgess was an attorney. Id., 302 S.E.2d at 326.
49. 279 S.C. at 129, 303 S.E.2d at 89.
50. 433 U.S. at 375.
[Vol. 36
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lina Bar51 and In re Delgado,52 the South Carolina Supreme
Court reasserted the prohibition against this type of conduct.
In Two Anonymous Members, the respondents were
charged with violating Disciplinary Rules 7-108(A) and (F)
5 3
which prohibit an attorney from communicating before trial
with a juror, a prospective juror, or a member of a juror's family.
The court held that respondents had knowingly communicated
with a family member of a prospective juror in violation of the
Disciplinary Rule." Since the issue was of novel impression, the
court adopted a "more lenient view" of the punishment than or-
dinarily would be required for a violation of this sort.5 Thus,
the court remanded the action for imposition of a private
reprimand.
In Two Anonymous Members, the respondents were practic-
ing law together when one was appointed by the court as counsel
in a capital case. Each separately questioned a client, the sister
of a prospective juror, regarding the juror's possible racial
prejudice and attitudes toward capital punishment. In their de-
fense, the respondents urged that the meaning of "members of a
family" in DR 7-108(F) should be confined to relatives living in
the same household. The supreme court, however, rejected this
construction and concluded that "family" includes persons re-
lated by blood or marriage to the juror "within the sixth de-
gree. 56 The court reasoned that DR 7-108(F) was intended to
51. 278 S.C. 477, 298 S.E.2d 450 (1982).
52. 279 S.C. 293, 306 S.E.2d 591 (1983).
53. DR 7-108(A) provides:
(A) Before the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not communi-
cate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to be a
member of the venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of the
case.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108(A) (Supp. 1983). DR 7-108(F) provides:
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to commu-
nications with or investigations of members of a family of a venireman or a
juror.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108(F) (Supp. 1983).
54. 278 S.C. at 481, 298 S.E.2d at 452.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 480, 298 S.E.2d at 452. The standard method for determining the degree
of kindred is to begin with the juror and continue up to the common ancestor and then
down to the person claiming kindred, inclusively, each step being considered as a degree.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20(6) (1976), which deals with determining the degree of




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
eliminate contacts with those able to exert influence over or
likely to communicate with the juror. The court felt that an ex-
pansive definition of "family" would best serve that purpose.
In Delgado, the court considered similar conduct during a
criminal trial. Defense counsel faced charges that he communi-
cated with a juror in violation of DR 7-108(B)(1), 57 which pro-
hibits attorney-juror communication during trial. The supreme
court unanimously held that the rule's prohibition was absolute
and that the conversations with the juror violated the
prohibition.
Delgado was speaking with jurors from a prior case about
improving his trial skills, when a juror from his present case re-
quested to join the group. The juror was allowed to join the
group, although Delgado instructed him that they could not talk
about the present case. Delgado asserted to the court that he
was presented with the dilemma of either offending the juror by
refusing to speak with him, or possibly violating a Disciplinary
Rule. The court rejected this argument and stated that the rule
prohibits all communication before and during a trial.5 8 The
court suggested that an attorney in such a situation should po-
litely excuse himself from the conversation. 9
The decision to admonish Delgado for his actions has sup-
port from other jurisdictions. In Omaha Bank for Cooperatives
v. Siouxland Cattle Cooperative,0 the Iowa Supreme Court
stated that for a lawyer to accept a drink offered by a juror dur-
ing the course of a trial was clearly misconduct. In Florida Bar
v. Peterson,"1 an attorney went to a delicatessen during a court
recess and allowed himself to be seated at a table occupied by
two jurors serving in his present case. Although the nature and
extent of their communication was unclear, the Florida Supreme
57. (B) During the trial of a case:
(1) A lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause an-
other to communicate with any member of the jury.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108(B)(1) (Supp. 1983).
58. 279 S.C. at 296, 306 S.E.2d at 593. The court referred to Ethical Consideration
7-29 of the Disciplinary Rules, which states in part that "there should be no extrajudicial
communication... with jurors during trial by... a lawyer connected with the case."
59. The court noted that although the rules now allow an attorney to approach a
juror after a case has been tried, he does so at his own peril. Id. at 297, 306 S.E.2d at 594.
60, 305 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1981). The Iowa case was not a disciplinary proceeding
against the attorney; the misconduct served as grounds for a new trial.
61. 418 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1982).
[Vol. 36
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Court held the attorney had violated DR 7-108(B)(1). 6 2
In Delgado, the court also expressed its disapproval of law-
yers, in a civil action, surreptitiously aiding the media to gain an
interview with an inmate-client. Delgado was charged with vio-
lating DR 7-107(G), 8 which prohibits a lawyer's participation in
extrajudicial statements relating to his client's character. He was
also charged with violating DR 1-102(A),6 4 which prohibits dis-
honest conduct by a lawyer.
After an unsuccessful attempt at arranging an interview for
his client at the end of a post-conviction hearing of a capital
case, 65 Delgado made an appointment to meet with the client,
who was incarcerated at the Columbia Correctional Institute
(CCI). He was accompanied at that meeting by a local newspa-
per reporter, who Delgado represented to prison personnel as be-
ing there on legal business.6 6 The reporter, however, conducted a
forty-five minute interview which was subsequently published.
The court held that the interview was not part of the legal
representation of the client, and that Delgado knew, or should
have known, that the interview was improper.6 The court stated
that the proper role of an attorney in such a situation is to pre-
62. Id. at 247. The text of DR 7-108(B)(1) is identical in Florida and South Caro-
lina. See supra note 57. The court imposed the sanction of a public reprimand and
placed the attorney on probation for one year on the condition that he pass the ethics
portion of the Florida Bar examination.
63. The rule provides in relevant part
(G) A lawyer... associated with a civil action shall not during... litigation
make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement... that relates to:
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or
prospectve witness.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-107(G)(2)(Supp. 1983).
64. The rule provides:
(A) a lawyer shall not.-
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-102(A)(4) (Supp. 1983).
65. The policy of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) relating to
press interviews with inmates on death row requires the approval of SCDC officials, the
inmate's defense counsel, and the prosecuting solicitor. The prosecuting solicitor, how-
ever, refused to permit the interview. Id. at 297, 306 S.E.2d at 594.
66. Delgado entered in the log book, as required by CCI, that both were there to see
the client regarding legal business. The court, however, found that no legal business was
conducted. Id. at 298, 306 S.E.2d at 594, 595.




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sent the client's cause in the courts, not to change the public
image of his client. The court further held that the manner in
which Delgado misrepresented his purpose 8 violated DR 1-
102(A)(4).9 The court found Delgado guilty of misconduct for
the two separate incidents and imposed the sanction of a public
reprimand.
Two Anonymous Members and Delgado assure practitioners
that communications with a juror or his family before or during
a trial will result in discipline. The court indicated that future
violations would receive harsh treatment. The Delgado decision
also alerts practitioners that statements to the media by the at-
torney or client should strictly adhere to the standards estab-
lished in the Disciplinary Rules.
V. DISCIPLINE AGAINST ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES FOR ALCOHOL-
RELATED OFFENSES
In two recent disciplinary proceedings, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, reaffirmed its intolerance of driving under the
influence of alcohol, and of drunk and disorderly conduct by
judges and attorneys. In In re Thomason," an attorney was
charged with violating Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(1), (5) and
(6),71 which prohibit conduct by an attorney that violates a Dis-
ciplinary Rule or reflects adversely on the attorney or on the ad-
ministration of justice.
The charges stemmed from Thomason's arrest and convic-
tion for public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, destruction of
city property, and resisting lawful arrest. 2 The Hearing Panel
68. See supra note 66.
69. 279 S.C. at 300, 306 S.E.2d at 596. For text of DR 1-102(A)(4), see supra note
64.
70. 279 S.C. 197, 304 S.E.2d 821 (1983).
71. DR 1-102 provides in part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-102(A)(1), (5), and (6) (Supp. 1983).
72. 279 S.C. at 198, 304 S.E.2d at 822. The charges were also based on allegations
that Thomason, while representing a wife in a divorce action, talked with the husband
about the pending action and made threats against him. Id. at 200, 304 S.E.2d at 822-23.
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
and Executive Committee of the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline7 3 found Thomason guilty of miscon-
duct and recommended a private reprimand.
In his defense, Thomason sought to introduce favorable
character testimony from a circuit court judge and a family
court judge. The court did not consider the testimony, holding it
improper for a judge to testify as a character witness on behalf
of one charged in a disciplinary proceeding.1 4
The court concurred in the Board's finding of professional
misconduct, but imposed the sanction of a public reprimand.75
The court reasoned that Thomason's conduct reflected adversely
on the administration of justice by bringing the legal profession
into disrepute.78
In In re Bradley, a Lee County magistrate was publicly
reprimanded for misconduct in office. The action arose out of
the arrest and conviction of Bradley for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol, and for his refusal to comply with requests made
of him at the time of arrest.78 The court found that Bradley's
conduct violated Canons 1 and 279 of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct and publicly reprimanded Bradley.
The public reprimands issued by the supreme court illus-
trate that it considers alcohol-related offenses serious violations
of the ethical obligations of attorneys and judges. While both
decisions involved aggravating conduct by those involved, the
supreme court is likely to similarly view any alcohol-related
offenses.
John M. G. McLeod
73. See supra note 20.
74. 279 S.C. at 200-01, 304 S.E.2d at 823. Additionally, the court instructed the
Board not to issue subpoenas for judges to serve as character witnesses. Id. at 201, 304
S.E.2d at 823.
75. Id. at 201, 304 S.E.2d at 823. For an explanation of the court's authority to
impose a more severe sanction, see supra note 27.
76. 297 S.C. at 201, 304 S.E.2d at 823.
77. 278 S.C. 426, 297 S.E.2d 797 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1445 (1983).
78. Bradley refused to give the arresting officer his driver's license, to leave his auto-
mobile, to take a breathalyzer test, and to sign the receipt form required by the Implied
Consent law. Id. at 426-27, 297 S.E.2d at 797.
79. Canon 1 requires a judge to maintain and enforce high standards of conduct,
while Canon 2 requires a judge to respect and comply with the law. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33,
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